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sible; and (2) these prejudices with their fearful effects on our society
must be supplanted by an understanding tolerance.0 2
0. MAX GARDNER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Statutory Construction-Judicial
Determination of End of War
Last June, in Ludecke v. Watkins,1 the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the Alien Enemy Act.2 In 1946 the Attorney Gen-
"2"A minority [including Dr. Frank P. Graham, President of the University
of North Carolina] of the Committee favors the elimination of segregation as an
ultimate goal but . . . opposes the imposition of a federal sanction. It believes
that federal aid to states for education, health, research and other public benefits
should be granted provided that the states do not discriminate in the distribution
of the funds. It dissents, however, from the majority's recommendation that the
abolition of segregation be made a requirement, until the people of the states in-
volved have themselves abolished the provisions in their state constitutions and
laws which now require segregation. Some members are against the non-segrega-
tion requirement in educational grants on the ground that it represents federal
control over education. They feel, moreover, that the best way to ultimately end
segregation is to raise the educational level of the people in the states affected; and
to inculcate both the teachings of religion regarding human brotherhood and the
ideals of our democracy regarding freedom and equality as a more solid basis for
genuine and lasting acceptance by the peoples of the states." THE REPORT OF THE
PRESMnENT'S CoMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTs 166-167 (Washington, 1947). "While
it is recognized that all barriers against the race cannot be eradicated overnight
by executive fiat, court decree, or legislative action, the Negro people of America
believe that it is the obligation of the government, of the labor movement, and of
all true progressives to take a clear, consistent, and unequivocal line against racial
discrimination and segregation. They believe that the objective of national policy
should be full equality for all citizens. And they have been encouraged in this
conviction by the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights." HENRY
LEE MooN ("The Ultimate Objective"), BALANCE OF POwER-THE NEGRO VOTE,
p. 218 (1948).
One can only begin to grasp the scope of the issue raised by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases when these two
statements are compared with excerpts from a speech made by Governor J. Strom
Thurmond (S. C.) at the Dixiecrat Convention in Jackson, Miss., during the
month of May, 1948: "All the laws of Washington and the bayonets of the Army
cannot force the Negro into their (Southern) homes, their schools, their churches
and their places of recreation and amusement." Quoted in Editorial, Charlotte
(N. C.) News, May 11, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1; or with the following statement
from DAVID L. COHN, WH RE I WAS BORN AND RAISED 294 (1948): "Since the
deep-seated mores of a people cannot be changed by law, and since segregation is
the most deep-seated and pervasive of the Southern white mores, it is evident
that he who attempts to abolish it by law runs risks of incalculable gravity. There
are nonetheless whites and Negroes who would break down segregation by Fed-
eral fiat. Let them beware. I have little doubt that in such a case the country
would find itself nearing civil war." And further, at page 294: "Yet whatever
may be the disabilities worked upon Negroes and whites by segregation; whether
the fears that provoke it are reasonable or unreasonable; whether it is anti-
democratic, anti-constitutional or anti-Christian, there is little chance, in my
opinion, that it will be obliterated in a foreseeable time. He who evades, beclouds,
or challenges the issue may do great harm to the whole American society."
'68 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1948).2REV. STAT. §40617 (1875), 40 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. §21 (1946)
("Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign
nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, at-
tempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign
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eral, under authority from the President, ordered the removal of
Ludecke, a German alien enemy. This accorded with the supposed
power granted by the Alien Enemy Act. The Supreme Court, through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in affirming a denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus held: the Alien Enemy Act bars judicial review of an
executive order commanding the removal of an alien enemy; this power
is properly exercised through the Attorney General; the statute is not
offensive to the bill of rights; the President's summary power does not
cease with the cessation of actual hostilities. In a dissenting opinion
Mr. Justice Black opined that we are no longer at war with Germany
"in the sense contemplated by the statute."' 3
The Alien Enemy Act clearly specifies that the President's power
thereunder becomes available after he proclaims a Congressionally de-
clared war,4 but the Act does not indicate as clearly as do many other
emergency statutes, when the war power thus conferred is to terminate. 5
We can discover the Congressional intent6 underlying this Act by
nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event,
all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the hostile nation or government ...
who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable
to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The Presi-
dent is authorized, in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other public
act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States toward
the aliens who become so liable . . . and to establish any other regulations which
are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety.").
'Joined by Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge. In a separate dissent Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Murphy and Rutledge, argued that summary removal orders
are offensive to the bill of rights during war or peace.
• U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §16; see, Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 668 (U. S. 1863)
(constitutionally Congress alone can declare war. President cannot initiate or
declare war, but he can recognize existence of a state of war and resist force by
force.) ; Eagleton, The Formal Function of the Declaration of War, 32 Am. J.
INT'L L. 19 (1938) ; Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp.
620 (W. D. La. 1944) (plaintiff's death in Japanase attack on Pearl Harbor did
not result from war. At that time there had been no declaration of war.) ; Verano
v. Dougelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (M. D. Pa. 1941) (there can be a condition
of war, but no war in fact without a declaration thereof).
'See, Ludecke v. Watkins, 68 Sup. Ct. 1429, 1437 (1948) (in his dissent Black
states that this "statute, unlike statutes passed in later years, did not expressly
prescribe the events which would for statutory purposes mark the termination of
the 'declared war.'"); Report of Subcommittee No. 4, H. R. committee on the
Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), War and Emergency Statutes Classified
by Termination Provisions (termination provisions include, cessation of hostilities,
termination of the war, some period after termination of the war, the end of the
emergency, specified dates).
'2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRuCTION 315 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943) (the
law must be applied according to the spirit of the legislative body); Heydon's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Repr. 637 (1584) (Lord Coke formulated the rules
for the "sure and true interpretation" of statutes. "[1] What was the common
law before the making of the act; [2] What was the mischief and defect for
which the common law did not provide; [3] What was the remedy the Parliament
hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; [4] The
true reason of the remedy."). See, United States v. City of San Francisco, 310
U. S. 16, 20 (1939) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Ralodam Co., 283 U. S. 643,
650 (1930) ; Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 50 (1911) ;
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 20 (1904); American Net and
Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474 (1891).
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referring to the debates which preceded its passage in July 1798.7 MvIr.
Otis, the chief Federalist sponsor of the bill, stated that the Act was
necessary unless Congress was "disposed to suffer a band of spies to
be spread through the country .. .who, in case of the introduction
of any enemy into our country, may join them in their attack upon us,
and in their plunder of our property."8 He later said, "in time of tran-
quility, he should not desire to put power like this into the hands of the
executive." 9 Mr. Gallatin, the leading Republican opponent, finally sup-
ported the bill as a security measure.1 0 The Act, as passed, specifically
grants the President summary powers to remove alien enemies only in
times of immediate danger. It states that the President's power shall
be effective when "any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated,
attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States...."11
This verbiage aims precisely at protection against direct or indirect at-
tack on the United States.
We next consider the public policy background, since any interpre-
tation of the Act must be made within its confines. 12 It is necessary
that nothing impair the power to wage war successfully."8 It is quite
clear that during a war the President must have authority to act quickly
without technical hindrances.1 4 In 1799, commenting on the Alien Acts
and enemy aliens generally, justice Iredell declared that on the eve of
war it was common to order alien enemies away'5 as protection against
the eighteenth-century equivalent of a potential fifth column. The Chief
Executive is in the most advantageous position to know who will en-
danger us. Disclosure of this information to the public during crucial
I BASS=-r, THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM (1906) ; 2 MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE
PEOPLE OF. THE UNITED STATES (1885); 1 ScHouLER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERIcA (1880); BASSETr, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(3rd ed. 1939).
88 ANNALS OF CONG. 1791 (1798).
O-Ibid.
'Old. at 2035 (1798).
" REv. STAT. 40617 (1875), 40 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. §21 (1948).
12 Cf. Walton v. Cotton, 19 How. 355 (U. S. 1856) ; Church of the Holy Trin-
ity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457 (1891) ; Feitler v. United States, 34 F. 2d 30
(C. C. A. 3d 1929) aff'd, 281 U. S. 389 (1929); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis.
327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911).
"See, Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d 290, 294 (App. D. C.
1946) (Alien Enemy Act constitutional and effective until the state of war has
ended).
14 See, Ex parte Graber, 247 Fed. 882, 885 (N. D. Ala. 1918) (application of
Alien Enemy Act in time of hostilities) ; 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1721 (2d
ed. 1945) (a government at war is subject to few restrictions in dealing with alien
enemies. The sovereign may take any action against them which it deems neces-
sary for national security).
"Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 831, No. 5, 126 (C. C. Pa. 1799) ("Why is it
done, but that it is deemed unsafe to retain in the country, men whose pre-
possessions are naturally so strong in favor of the enemy that it may be appre-
hended that they will either join in arms, or that they will do mischief in his
favor.").
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hours through judicial record is inconceivable,'0 therefore the statute
gives the President the summary powers of removal.
17
The act is not criminal. The alien enemy is being removed in order
to prevent him from committing a crime.' The removal is not punish-
ment, yet it has been said that removal, like deportation may result in
the loss "of all that makes life worth living." 19  "This possibility
approaches probability when removal is to Germany, a country ravaged
by war and occupied by four conquering armies.
'20
During peacetime, aliens get the "same protection and the same re-
dress for injury" we give our citizens.2 1  No alien may be deported
without the right to have counsel, to hear charges against him, and to
examine witnesses.22 This guarantee of due process must be limited in
wartime. The Alien Enemy Act not only limits these protections but
entirely eliminates many of them. As it is necessary that nothing impair
the power to wage war successfully it is also necessary that emergency
powers granted constitutionally in wartim0 3 do not impair the safe-
guards of freedom and liberty erected by the Constitution for times of
peace.24  Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the principal case cites Woods v.
Miller,25 which deals with the Housing and Rent Control Act of 1947,
as authority for continuing the President's power under the Alien Enemy
Act. Since greater weight should be assigned to personal liberty than
" See, Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d 290, 294 (App. D. C.
1946).
'1See, Lockington v. Smith, 15 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 8,448 (C. C. Pa. 1817)
(object of act "was to provide for the public safety, by imposing such restraints
upon alien enemies, as the chief executive magistrate of the United States might
think necessary, and of which his particular situatiom enabled him best to judge."
[italics supplied]).
" Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 831, No. 5, 126 (C. C. Pa. 1799) ("... it is
ridiculous to talk of a crime, because perhaps the only crime . . . is . . . being
borr; in another country, and having a strong attachment to it. . . . [The alien
enemy] is not punished for a crime that he has committed, but deprived of
the power of committing one hereafter to which even a sense of patriotism may
tempt a warm and misguided mind... ."See, Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1921)."See, United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556, 562 (S. D.
N. Y. 1946).
2' IV PROCEEDINGS, American Society of International Law 20 (1910) (so said
Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt).
-- See, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 153 (1944) (relies on the rules of
the specific agency trying an alien for deportation. "These rules are designed
as safeguards against essentially unfair procedures.").
2" John Quincy Adams as quoted in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605,
622 (1930) ("This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks
down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property
and of life.").
" 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsmucTiON 318 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943)
(where a statute tends to interfere or disrupt long established personal rights the
courts have been inclined to employ a restricted interpretation thereof) ; id. at 326
(statutes permitting summary proceedings sometimes operate harshly on the party
adversely affected. Thus the courts have been inclined to a narrow construction
of such legislation).
2 333 U. S. 140 (1948).
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to economic interests26 that decision, and others of the same ilk, cannot
be controlling here.
Therefore, it is important to determine whether we were at war or
peace within the contemplation of this act when the President's sum-
mary powers were exercised. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, like Lord Mac-
naughten in 1902,27 refused to recognize any period of time which is
neither wholly war nor wholly peace. It is submitted that, for the pur-
poses of the Alien Enemy Act, there is an interval period between actual
hostilities and the "peace of Peace" during which the Act is not effec-
tive. Recently the Commonwealth Arbitration Court drew a bedevilled
analogy concerning the period immediately following actual hostilities.
"I believe that Christmas dinner will end with the grace said at the
conclusion of the meal. And even if the subsequent coffee and post-
prandial cigar can by tradition be included, I have never heard that the
washing up of the dishes used is regarded as forming part of the
meal."'28 After the Spanish American War the Supreme Court insisted
that a state of war did not cease until the ratification of a peace treaty,29
but a federal court refused to impose a death penalty on a soldier who
deserted during the interval between actual hostilities 'and the signing
of the treaty of peace.30 On August 18, 1945, President Truman
issued an executive order in which he prescribed policies "arising out
of the transition from war to peace." 3' In his message to Congress on
September 6, 1945, the President said, "The end of the war has come
imore swiftly than most of us anticipated . . . the time has not yet
'arrived, however, for the proclamation of the cessation of hostilities,
much less the termination of the war."' 2 The President envisioned an
interval period which was neither wholly war, nor wholly peace.
President Wilson, on November 11, 1918, speaking to the two
Houses of Congress concerning the acceptance by Germany of the
Armistice said, "The war thus comes to an end." The "state of war"
did not terminate until 1921 when Congress passed a joint resolution
to that effect.m In United States v. Hicks34 the court refused to
20 Note, Judicial Determination of the End of War, 47 COL. L. REv. 255 (1947)
(assignment of greater weight to personal liberty then to economic interests has
become a thoroughly embedded principle of constitutional law); the majority
opinion also cites Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111 (1946) (deals with
the Office of Price Administration); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251
U. S. 146 (1919) (war-time Prohibition Act).2 See, Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd., [1902] A. C. 484, 497.
"As quoted: E. A. D., Has World War II Ended?, 20 AusT. L. J. 2 (1946).
2 IHijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315 (1904) (damages for ship detained after
hostilities but before peace treaty).
"itn re Cadwaller, 127 Fed. 881 (Mo. 1904) (the treaty of peace had not been
arranged, but the war would not be further prosecuted. Among other indications
the United States commenced to disband its army).
"1 Exec. Order No. 9599, 10 FFD. REG. 10155 (1945).
32 H. R. Doc. No. 282, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
1142 STAT. 105 (1921). " 256 Fed. 707 (W. D. Ky. 1919).
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penalize the defendant for violating a federal statute which was to be
effective "during the present war." The violation took place twenty
days after President Wilson's communication. Held: The acts of the
defendant were not committed within the true meaning of "during the
present war." Although a treaty of peace usually terminates war, "his-
tory shows many instances in which wars were terminated without any
treaty at all . . . a treaty is not essential to the actual ending of a
war . . . for reasons more or less publicly known no treaty of peace
has been made." The President's communication to the entire nation
showed "the fact of the actual termination of real war." The phrase
"during the present war . . . does not appear to be a case for tech-
nicalities but for facts."3 5
Generally an act of Congress or an executive proclamation is neces-
sary to end a war for the purposes of applying a particular statute, un-
less otherwise specifically stated in the statute being considered. 36 But
the type of statute and the right affected have an influence on the
court's reaction to a war measure.3 7 Many statutes speak in terms of
specific termination dates but the Alien Enemy Act does not.
Further, Mr. Justice Frankfurter claims that if the powers of re-
moval are not applicable after the "shooting war," since the act is not
a criminal statute, its effects would be completely nullified because de-
portation of alien enemies is impractical during the "shooting war."
Although deportation today contemplates sending the alien back to the
country from whence he came, the statute uses the word removal. In
1798, when the statute was passed, there were many parts of the world
to which the alien enemy could be removed during the "shooting war."
Therefore, merely because it is no longer practical to remove alien
enemies during a "shooting war," we cannot allow the power to remove
to become a power to punish. It becomes so when the removal is made
after the alien enemy is no longer dangerous.
It is submitted that the powers given by the Act cease when there
is no longer any danger of attack from the enemy. Generally that
would be after the actual cessation of hostilities, when the "shooting
stops"; when peace in fact, if not technically, exists. That interval
between the actual hostilities and the "peace of Peace" is peace in fact.
JOHN DAviD R ODER.
'United States v. Switzer, 6 Alaska 223 (1920) (uses U. S. v. Hicks as
authority).
"6 Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 (1920); Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S.
315 (1903) ; The Protector, 12 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1871).
M Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919)
(cited by the majority in the principal case to uphold its decision that the act
of 1798 shall remain in effect until the "peace of Peace." Indicates that a statute
might be held invalid because the emergency which called it into being had ended,
despite the fact that a technical state of war continues).
